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Abstract—Online social media (OSM) has a enormous influ-
ence in today’s world. Some individuals view OSM as fertile
ground for abuse and use it to disseminate misinformation and
political propaganda, slander competitors, and spread spam.
The crowdturfing industry employs large numbers of bots and
human workers to manipulate OSM and misrepresent public
opinion. The detection of online discussion topics manipulated
by OSM abusers is an emerging issue attracting significant
attention. In this paper we propose an approach for quantifying
the authenticity of online discussions based on the similarity of
OSM accounts participating in the discussion to known abusers
and legitimate accounts. Our method uses several similarity
functions for the analysis and classification of OSM accounts. The
proposed methods are demonstrated using Twitter data collected
for this study and previously published Arabic honeypot dataset.
The former includes manually labeled accounts and abusers
who participated in crowdturfing platforms. Evaluation of the
topic’s authenticity, derived from account similarity functions,
shows that the suggested approach is effective for discriminating
between topics that were strongly promoted by abusers and topics
that attracted authentic public interest.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social media (OSM) allows people to share opinions
and content, and in some cases, influence large segments of
society [1], [2], [3]. Significant attention has been paid to
trends emerging from OSM [4]. Machiavellian individuals and
organizations often attempt to harness the power of OSM in
order to gain influence, damage the reputation of competitors,
or spread political propaganda by financing disinformation
campaigns [5], [6], [7]. Such campaigns are called to as crowd-
turfing, stemming from crowdsourcing1 and astroturfing2.
In many cases crowdturfing campaigns utilize OSM ac-
counts, operated by humans [5], [6] or by computer programs
known as bots [8], [9]. These malicious accounts may cause
serious damage. For example, in 2014, tweets posted by
socialbots influenced automated trading algorithms, causing
a boost in the stock market prices of a tech company whose
stock value jumped 200-fold, increasing the company’s market
value to five billion dollars in a matter of weeks [9]. In
another case, Vietnamese officials employed a large number
1Employing the Internet crowd to perform many micro-jobs.
2Hiding the sponsors of a message to make it appear genuine.
of crowdturfers to engage in online discussions to spread
messages in support of the ruling political party’s policies [2].
More recently, fake news was reported to proliferate in the US
and European political arena [10], [11]. All of these examples
demonstrate the need for comprehensive solutions to tackle
OSM manipulation by crowdturfers [12].
In this study, we strive to discriminate between authentic
online discussions and crowdturfing campaigns. Currently,
extensive research is being conducted in the area of detecting
OSM abusers such as spammers, bots, trolls, etc [6], [7], [9].
However, it is not always possible to identify an account as
a human or bot, because of the prevalence of semi-automated
accounts within OSM [13]. Similarly, it not always possible
to differentiate between crowdturfers and grassroots efforts to
promote an area of online discussion.
Further complicating matters, are casual crowdturfers –
OSM accounts that largely exhibit authentic behavior but
occasionally participate in malicious manipulation of OSM
discussions [6], [14]. This type of behavior in which abusers
attempt to appear as regular accounts as much as possible is
known as camouflage [15], [16]. Therefore, quantifying the
level of authenticity of an OSM account remains challenging.
In this study, we propose several similarity functions for
comparing OSM accounts participating in a particular online
discussion to both confirmed OSM abusers and known le-
gitimate accounts. These similarity functions can be used to
quantify the level of an account’s authenticity, where abusers
and legitimate accounts are placed on the opposite ends of
the authenticity scale. Accounts’ authenticity can, in turn, be
aggregated to quantify the authenticity of online discussions.
We demonstrate that the distribution of accounts’ authenticity
is different in topics that are prone to OSM manipulation and
topics that attract authentic public interest. In order to choose
the best similarity function we used three Twitter3 datasets,
two of which were collected during this study and one which
was made available by Morstatter et al. [17].
The contributions of this paper are:
3https://twitter.com/
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• a collection of two Twitter datasets that include 605 man-
ually labeled accounts, 1,006 abusers who participated in
crowdturfing platforms, and 88,506 unlabeled accounts
(the data is available upon request);
• an application of similarity functions for account type
classification;
• a visual representation of the account authenticity distri-
bution within OSM discussions;
The Credibility of online information has been discussed
in [18], however as the researchers mention, their approach
only considers shallow characteristics (e.g., number of fol-
lowers). They do not distinguish between accounts that have
acquired a positive reputation in the past and those who have
been spreading misinformation, spam, etc. On the other hand,
our approach does exactly the opposite. It analyzes all the
content published by the OSM accounts in order to improve
prediction of OSM account authenticity. Intuitive visualization
of the account authenticity distribution will help OSM analysts
in identifying fake news, assessing public opinion about com-
mercial products and services, identifying OSM manipulation
in political campaigns, etc.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section II
we review well-known methods for the detection of abusers
and the concept of topic modeling. In Section III, we explain
our approach for quantifying the authenticity of online discus-
sions using similarity functions, including the account labeling
process (see Section III-A), a full description of the similarity
functions (see Section III-B), and the approach for measuring
the authenticity of accounts and topics (see Section III-C).
The evaluation of our method is addressed in Section IV.
More specially, the datasets we evaluated our method on are
presented in Section IV-A, and the results of the evaluation
carried out on the datasets are presented in Section IV-B
Section V includes ethical considerations, and we conclude
the paper in Section VI with a summary and introduction to
future work.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we outline studies involving the identification
of abusers in OSM. In 2012, Cao et al. [19] proposed a method
that is used to cluster accounts based on the similarity of
posted URLs; once this is done, each cluster is classified as
either malicious or not by extracting behavioral and content
features.
In 2013, a method for the identification of crowdturfers
on Twitter was presented by Lee et al. [6]. Their method
relies on extracting features, which are used to train and test
supervised machine learning (ML) classifiers. The features
extracted were associated with account properties, activity
patterns, and linguistic properties.
In 2015, another crowdturfing detection approach was de-
veloped by Song et al. [20]. This approach identifies artificially
promoted objects (such as posts, pages, and URLs), rather than
crowdturfers or bots’ accounts. They described two types of
malicious service provider websites: crowdturfing and black
market websites. Black market websites usually operate a
large number of bots to perform promotion tasks in a given
period of time; these bots resemble human accounts, however
they operate as a group, and their activities are synchronized,
performing the same task with a single deadline. On the other
hand, crowdturfing websites offer crowdturfers, which are
either humans or advanced human-like bots, to execute their
tasks. Song et al. found that the accounts of crowdturfers are
more popular than normal accounts, and their activities are not
synchronized. Later, they extracted features from retweeting
patterns and used supervised ML algorithms to classify a tweet
as artificially promoted or not.
Dickerson et al. [7] introduced an approach for the detection
of bots which also used supervised ML classifiers based on
features extracted from sentiment analysis, social network
analysis, posted content, and account properties.
In 2016, Davis et al. [21] presented BotOrNot, a bot
identification platform available through a Web user interface.
BotOrNot evaluates different aspects of Twitter accounts,
including: social network connections, account properties,
content, and behavioral features, as well as sentiment analysis.
Also in 2016, another bot detection method was introduced
by Morstatter et al. [17]. In contrast to other similar studies
[6], [7], [20], [21], their proposed method focused on a new
supervised learning algorithm rather than feature extraction.
Their classifier was based on AdaBoost [22], a known boosting
algorithm, which is intended to improve the F1 measure, main-
taining a balance between precision and recall. Morstatter et
al. used the latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) topic probability
distributions as features to test their proposed approach.
The activities of accounts within OSM are naturally re-
flected in the content of their posts. Some accounts publish
posts mainly about cars, football, or movies. Merchandise or
service advertisements spread by company accounts also have
their own characteristic vocabulary. In contrast, accounts that
“retweet for hire” may have no topical preference. LDA [23]
can be used to identify the topics discussed in a large corpus of
textual documents. Morstatter et al. [17] treated each account
as a document consisting of the concatenation of all of the
content of its tweets. The LDA model provided a probability
distribution for each account for each topic. These probabilities
were used as features to train an account classifier.
Although topic detection was used in the past to assist in the
identification of OSM abusers, to the best of our knowledge,
the current work is the first to focus on the detection of topics
prone to OSM abuse.
While the prior studies mentioned above introduce novel
approaches to detect OSM abusers and/or promoted posts,
none of them provides a mechanism to measure the impact
that these OSM abusers have on online discussions.
Studies, such as [18] and [24] focus on information credi-
bility in OSM. Castillo et al. [18] studied the propagation of
false rumors on Twitter during a crisis event. This approach
is composed of three parts: emerging event detection, manual
labeling, and feature extraction.
The first part consists of collecting information cascades
which are collections of messages related to specific events.
This step relies on a third party tool called Twitter Mon-
itor,4 which receives a query composed of keywords and
logical propositions as input and returns the relevant set of
messages. These cascades are then manually labeled using
the crowdsourcing Mechanical Turk service. Finally, several
factors observed in OSM are used to derive features, such
as sentiments expressed in tweets, profile characteristics, and
several other known features.
Ferrara et al. [24], proposed a ML framework to detect pro-
moted campaigns and separate them from organic campaigns.
In this study, topics are grouped by hashtags, which suggests
that this method is applicable only to Twitter or to an OSM
that uses similar tags. A number of features are presented,
including network and diffusion-based, user account (profile)
properties, sentiment features, and content-based features.
While [18] and [24] tackle the problem of information
credibility in OSM, we have identified the following limi-
tations: both approaches use sentiment analysis which make
them language dependent. Moreover, the need for information
about the online profile (i.e., number of friends and followers)
limits the applicability of these solutions to a specific OSM
platform, since each platform possesses different properties for
describing their profiles. On the other hand, in our approach
four out of five of the proposed similarity functions rely on
text properties, such as term probability distributions, term co-
occurrences, etc., making our framework capable of working
in multiple languages and on different OSM platforms.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
In this paper, we propose an approach for discriminating
between online discussions artificially promoted by crowd-
turfers and those that attract the authentic interest of OSM
accounts. In order to identify malicious manipulation of online
discussions, we propose an approach based on estimating the
prevalence of abusers among the OSM accounts, which con-
tributed to the given online discussion. Our general approach
is presented in Figure 1. The steps performed, beginning with
data collection and concluding with an estimation of topic
authenticity, are described below.
Fig. 1. Estimation of topic authenticity
4http://www.twittermonitor.net/
The first step is the data collection process. A discussion
of the methods for collecting OSM data are out of the scope
of this paper. The datasets used in this study are described in
Section IV-A.
In the topic extraction stage for identifying online discus-
sions we use a topic detection algorithm called LDA with
hyperparameters optimized for the targeted OSM platform. A
different algorithm like latent semantic analysis can also be
used. It is also possible to identify specific online discussion
topics using predefined sets of keywords.
While executing the topic extraction, the account labeling
process can execute simultaneously in order to obtain a ground
truth labeled OSM account dataset. For a more in depth
description of the account labeling process, including a review
of author types and the manual labeling guideline’s definitions,
see Section III-A. The labeled accounts and the topics are used
later in order to quantify the authenticity of the OSM accounts
based on several similarity functions (see Section III-B). Later,
we present the authenticity distribution for every topic in
Section III-C.
A. Account Labeling
We propose two alternative approaches for creating labeled
datasets of OSM accounts. The first labeling approach is
based on clustering the accounts, in order to have the highest
variability among accounts, and then selecting a sample from
each cluster; labels are assigned to the samples after manually
inspecting them. We faced two primary challenges associated
with this approach: the need for strict, unambiguous labeling
guidelines and selection of accounts for labeling. The second
approach is based on acquiring a ground truth collection of
OSM accounts that are known, with absolute certainty, to
participate in crowdturfing platforms. In the following section,
we present the guidelines for labeling accounts manually (see
Section III-A1 and explain the manner for selecting accounts
for labeling (see Section III-A2)).
1) Manual Labeling Guidelines: We established the follow-
ing guidelines for the manual classification of OSM accounts
as abusers or legitimate accounts. Figure 2 presents the man-
ual labeling process. Strict adherence to these clear labeling
guidelines will ensure a high quality dataset.
(1) If the account explicitly mentions that it is a bot in its
profile description, then we assume it is a benign automated
account. We mark it as legitimate, because the account does
not deceive OSM users regarding its nature.
(2) If an OSM account declares itself as a news feed or
any other type of content aggregator, we attempt to verify its
authenticity. If the news source is determined to be untrusted
or is not a major news site, we label it as an abuser, as opposed
to a legitimate account.
(3) If the account claims to be a company profile, this claim
is validated as follows: (3.1) Check to see that the account
description links to an official website of the company. (3.2)
Look for a reference to the investigated Twitter account on the
company’s official home page, contact us page, press releases,
or product pages. If such a reference is found, the account is
Fig. 2. The manual labeling process.
legitimate. Otherwise, it is considered a deceptive account and
marked as an abuser.
(4) Next, we inspect the account’s behavior. If there are clear
signs of automation, e.g., posting every five minutes twenty-
four hours a day, or the account exhibits behavior not possible
for a human user, we label it as an abuser.
(5) If there are many advertisements or retweets with
marketing information alongside neutral or personal-looking
posts, this is considered evidence that the account is involved
in spam or crowdturfing activities. It is important to note that
some users install programs that post on their behalf; in such
cases, the account exhibits both human-like and non-human
behavior patterns. OSM accounts operated by naive users who
grant permissions to untrusted third party applications are easy
targets for spammers and crowdturfing platforms. Thus, if
the OSM account shows some human behavior, but also has
frequent automated retweets or many advertisements, we treat
it as an abuser.
(6) Finally, if the majority of the posts published by the
account contain authentic content (for example, if traces of
the same personal content are found in other online social
networks), we label it as legitimate. Having reliable labels for
legitimate accounts is important for training some supervised
machine learning classifiers.
Unfortunately, it is not always possible to determine with
absolute certainty whether or not an OSM account is legiti-
mate. If none of the conditions apply or we have any doubt
regarding a given account it remains unlabeled.
We used the committee of experts approach in order to reach
an agreement on the account labels. Four experts (students)
participated in the manual labeling process. Three of the
experts independently reviewed the same groups of unlabeled
accounts and analyzed their Twitter profiles and posts. The
experts then assigned a label of either legitimate account or
abuser to each account based on the guidelines mentioned (see
Figure 2). In cases of complete or almost complete agreement
among the experts, the label was set according to majority
vote. In cases of reasonable doubt the account was not labeled.
2) Account Selection for Manual Labeling: After defining
the manually labeled guidelines, the arduous process of man-
ual labeling should begin. However, the question is, which
accounts should be selected for labeling? A small sample of
labeled instances randomly selected from a dataset may not
accurately reflect the given population. In order to have the
greatest amount of variability among the labeled accounts, we
first cluster the OSM accounts and select a sample of accounts
from each cluster.
Clustering the accounts can be performed based on features
extracted from the OSM account profile. Several studies found
that profile information is useful for the identification of
abusers [6], [13]. We used features that were reported to
perform well in the past [6], [7], [21]. These features include:
the account age, number of followers, number of friends,
friend-follower ratio, total number of posts, whether the profile
configuration has been personalized or is the default setting,
whether the profile image has been personalized or is the
default setting, number of lists, whether the account has been
verified by the social network, length of the screen name,
average minutes between posts, average posts published during
the total lifetime of the account, average posts published on
days that the account has been active, and the number of
retweets received.
3) Verified Abusers: As an alternative to the manual ac-
count labeling, crowdturfing services can be used to obtain a
sample set of verified abusers. The idea is similar to the use of
honeypots for attracting spammers, but in this case we actively
invite abusers to fall into the trap.
First, we create several public Twitter accounts, which will
serve as honeypots, and publish posts that contain clearly iden-
tified unique keywords. Then, we buy followers and retweets
from major crowdturfing sites, such as: intertwitter.com, fast-
followerz.com, socialshop.co, socioblend.com, coincrack.com,
and retweets.pro. Since the accounts we created have no online
activity, a short while after engaging the crowdturfing sites, all
of the accounts’ followers are crowdturfers as well. We used
Twitter API service in order to find users who cited the posts
published by the honeypots and mark them as abusers. When
taking this approach for collecting abuser’s data, there are a
few points to keep in mind: (1) keywords contained in the posts
published by honeypot accounts must be unique in order to
avoid false labeling, (2) the number of acquired followers and
retweets should be modest enough to remain under the radar of
OSM trend analysis engines and various content aggregators,
and (3) some of the accounts used for crowdturfing are short-
lived and may be blocked by OSM providers 1-3 weeks after
they are used for crowdturfing; we have chosen to ignore such
accounts in order to focus on the more advanced abusers who
try to avoid being detection.
B. Account Similarity Functions
In order to quantify the authenticity of OSM accounts, we
must introduce the following definitions. Let A denote the
set of accounts in the dataset. Let P denote the collection
of posts published by these accounts. P (x) ⊆ P denotes the
collection of posts published by account x ∈ A. For every post
p ∈ P , A(p) denotes its author. We consider two posts equal
(px = py) if their text is equal after stemming and stop words
removal. In order to estimate the authenticity of accounts
we investigated multiple similarity functions. The similarity
functions are defined over pairs of accounts f : A2 → [0, 1].
A good similarity function f(x, y) will return a low value
if x ∈ A and y ∈ A belong to different classes, e.g., x
is an abuser and y is legitimate, or vice versa. Similarly, a
high value of f(x, y) should indicate, with high probability,
that x and y belong to the same class. In this study we
used five different similarity functions: common-posts, topic-
distribution, profile-properties, behavioral-properties, and bag-
of-words.
Example 1: Consider, for example, the OSM accounts and
posts presented in Figure 3. Accounts (ovals) point to their
posts. Accounts may have properties associated with them,
e.g., the number of friends and followers, and the time since
the account was created. A2 was labeled as an abuser, and
A5 is a legitimate account. A1, A3, and A4 are unlabeled. We
use this example to demonstrate the similarity functions.
Fig. 3. Illustration for understanding the similarity functions
1) Common-Posts: OSM accounts that publish the same
content might be part of a crowdturfing campaign [14], [25].
This similarity function shows which accounts spread the same
content across the OSM. We use the Jaccard coefficient to
normalize the number of common posts.
common-posts(x, y) =
|P (x) ∩ P (y)|
|P (x) ∪ P (y)|
Example 2: Consider the example in Figure 3. A2 has one
post in common with A1 (despite the minor differences in the
posts’ text).
2) Bag-of-Words: Common posts may work well for iden-
tifying groups of cooperating spammers or simple bots used
to promote a product or website through search engine op-
timization. However, this function may fail to detect human
operated accounts that are employed in the same campaign
due to text variability in the crowdturfers’ posts. Nevertheless,
abusers that participate in the same crowdturfing campaign
would likely use roughly similar vocabularies.
In order to quantify the similarity of vocabularies used
by different accounts we employ the bag-of-words approach.
According to this approach, all the content posted by a given
account is transformed into a set of terms. We denote the set of
stemmed terms used in a post p ∈ P as W (p). We assume that
W (p) does not contain stop-words. We define the vocabulary
W (x) of an account x ∈ A as the collection of all terms used
by this account in the given dataset W (x) =
⋃
p∈P W (p). We
use Jaccard coefficient to quantify the similarity between the
vocabularies used by two accounts:
bag-of -words(x, y) =
|W (x) ∩W (y)|
|W (x) ∪W (y)|
Hashtags and URLs are considered as terms for this purpose
and are not stemmed.
Example 3: Consider accounts A1 and A3 in Figure 3. The
term video and URL1 are used by both. This, these, a, just,
seem are stop words, leaving nine terms, including URLs,
which were used by either A1 or A3. Thus, the bag-of-words
similarity between them is: bag-of -words(A1, A3) = 29
3) Topic-Distribution: The next similarity function com-
pares the topical distributions of posts published by each
account. While the bag-of-words roughly compares which
terms are used by two accounts, here we consider the usage
frequencies as well.
The LDA algorithm for topic detection determines the prob-
ability of each vocabulary term to be used in each topic. Based
on these term-in-topic probabilities LDA-based topic detection
determines the probability Tp,i that the post p belongs to topic
i. Next, for each OSM account x and each topic i, we compute
the average probability that x’s posts belong to topic i.
T ′x,i = avgp∈P (x) {Tp,i}
Finally, for each pair of accounts x, y, we measure the
similarity between vectors T ′x and T
′
y using cosine similarity.
topic-distr(x, y) = cosine similarity(T ′x, T
′
y)
Although any kernel function can be used to compare vector
representations of accounts, we only use cosine similarity in
the rest of this section; other kernel functions we tried during
this study produced similar results.
4) Profile Properties: Accounts can be compared based on
the features extracted from their OSM profiles. We use profile
features that were shown to help in account classification in the
past [6], [7], [21]. The features are listed in Section III-A2. Let−→xp and −→xp represent the profile feature vectors of accounts x
and y, respectively. We use cosine similarity to compare these
two vectors.
profile-prop(x, y) = cosine similarity(−→xp,−→yp)
Example 4: Examples of profile features are presented above
the account names in Figure 3. For example, A1 has 12
friends and 10 followers, and it is 780 days old. According to
these features, A1 is more similar to A5 than to A2, having
profile-prop(A1, A5) = 0.95 and profile-prop(A1, A2) =
0.03, respectively.
5) Behavioral-Properties: Techniques relying on features
that describe account behavior were also useful for the identi-
fication of OSM abusers [6], [7]. These features include: total
number of retweets, average number of retweets, average num-
ber of hashtags, average number of hyperlinks, average user
mentions, and average post length. Similar to profile-prop,
we use cosine similarity to compare the account behavior
feature vectors.
behavior-prop(x, y) = cosine similarity(−→xb,−→yb)
where −→xb and −→yb are vectors of features describing the account
behavior.
C. Authenticity of Accounts and Topics
In order to quantify the authenticity of OSM accounts in
the dataset, we compare them to labeled accounts (discussed
in Section III-A) using the similarity functions presented in
Section III-B. The simplest and most intuitive algorithm that
can be applied in these settings is k-nearest neighbors (KNN).
According to this algorithm, for each unlabeled account x, we
select the k most similar labeled accounts (nearest neighbors).
Then, x receives the label of the majority of the nearest
neighbors. This approach results in quite accurate classification
as will be discussed in Section IV. Nevertheless, for the
purpose of this study, binary classification is not always
sufficient. Since many crowdturfers are labeled as abusers, but
they are actually behave partially legitimate, we can use the
classification confidence as the measure for the authenticity of
an account.
More specifically, we define the authenticity of the account
x as the confidence in x being a legitimate account. Since
this paper focuses on account similarity functions, we choose
various KNN confidence measures [26]. The choice of the
specific confidence measure is guided by the characteristics
of our problem domain. First, the number of labeled accounts
is rather limited, especially if we choose the manual labeling
approach. Second, the similarity to the labeled accounts con-
tains important information that should be considered. Finally,
we acknowledge the fact that there are many sub-types of
abusers and legitimate accounts. This is clearly indicated by
the multi-step manual labeling process presented earlier. Thus,
we should not rely on the similarity of the tested account to
distant labeled instances of each class, but only consider the
similarity to the nearest neighbors.
We choose the confidence measure similar to the one
defined by Arlandis et al. [27],
acc-auth(x) = 0.5−
∑
y∈Nkabuser(x) f(x, y)∑
y∈Nk(x) f(x, y)
Where Nk(x) is the set of x’s nearest neighbors,
Nkabuser(x) ⊆ Nk(x) is the set of known abusers among the
nearest neighbors, and f is the account similarity function.
The constant factor is set to 0.5 in this equation in order
to allow negative, as well as positive authenticity values
(authenticity(x) ∈ [−0.5, 0.5]).
The last step of the proposed approach is aggregating the
authenticity of individual OSM accounts into authenticity
of topics. While there are multiple aggregation options, we
consider the following two aggregations:
a) Post level aggregation: In order to form the topic
authenticity, every post is associated with the authenticity of
its author. The authenticities of the posts which related to a
specific topic are accumulated in the topic authenticity.
topic-auth-1(i) =
∑
p∈P
Tp,i · acc-auth(A(p)) (1)
b) Author level aggregation: First, a set of authors of
posts for a specific topic is determined. Then, authenticities
of the author accounts are aggregated. We define the set of
accounts involved in a specific topic i as
D(i) = {A(p) : Tp,i =MAXj {Tp,j}} .
Here, every post is associated with a single topic – the one
it belongs to with the highest probability. An account is
associated with a topic if at least one of its posts is associated
with that topic. The account level authenticity of the topic i
is then determined as follows:
topic-auth-2(i) =
∑
x∈D(i)
acc-auth(x) (2)
We do not distinguish between authentic and malicious
posts published by the same account. Thus, in the case of
partially automated accounts and casual crowdturfers, even
topics in which they express authentic interest are tainted
by their illegitimate activities. Future work may consider
specific post classification into legitimate activities or activities
that are part of a crowdturfing campaign. We argue that
information contained in a single post is often insufficient for
performing accurate classification, especially in the case of
human operated crowdturfing accounts.
The proposed post level topic authenticity has higher gran-
ularity and is more robust, because it considers the affinity of
a post to every topic. In contrast, the author level aggregation
may introduce more noise in small datasets, because it disre-
gards the lesser post to topic affinities. It means that the author
level topic authenticity is affected only by a single topic as
opposed to post topic level authenticity which is measured by
each topic. Nevertheless, author level aggregation is impor-
tant, because it reduces the weight of accounts aggressively
publishing on a specific topic.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate the investigated account simi-
larity functions on three Twitter datasets and demonstrate the
topic authenticity estimation.
A. Datasets
Three datasets were used for evaluation of the author simi-
larity functions: Manually Labeled Accounts, Verified Abuser,
and Arabic Honeypot datasets. The first two datasets are
associated with virtual TV domain. These two datasets contain
the same unlabeled accounts and their posts. However, their la-
beled accounts are different. The Arabic Honeypot dataset [17]
was used for validation of the results.
1) Manually Labeled Accounts Dataset: For this study we
collected Twitter data over a period of five months (from
April 25 to September 19, 2016), crawled with the help
of VICO Research & Consulting GmbH [28]. We collected
tweets containing one of the following key phrases: ‘Online
TV,’ ‘Internet TV,’ and ‘Smart TV.’ This domain was chosen
because it contains many tweets published by both abusers
and legitimate accounts.
We used the Twitter REST API [29] to collect the profile
features, such as number of statuses, number of followers,
number of friends, etc. The Virtual TV Manually Labeled
Account dataset contain 89,111 accounts, and 188,211 tweets
that were published by these accounts. Following the manual
labeling process presented in Section ??, we identified 289
abusers and 316 legitimate accounts.
2) Verified Abuser Dataset: In order to form the set of
verified abusers, we created nine public Twitter accounts that
published a total of 53 posts. Using crowdturfing sites, we
hired 3,169 Twitter verified abusers to follow those accounts
and/or retweet their posts. These accounts are defined as ver-
ified abusers, because they make receive financial incentives
to perform activities like following accounts and retweeting
posts. 1,968 of the verified abusers were blocked by Twitter
during the period of our study; therefore, these accounts were
not included in the current study because, with the exception
of the posts that we paid for, the data does not include their
posts or profile information. The other 1,201 accounts were
still active at the time of this paper’s writing.
Four out of five similarity functions used in this study rely
on posts. Thus, we disregard 195 accounts, which published
less than thirty posts in their lifetime. Overall, our dataset
contains 1,006 active Twitter accounts of verified abusers
with more than thirty posts each. In addition, the dataset also
contains 1,068 additional accounts that posted about the virtual
TV domain. We consider these accounts as legitimate for the
sake of this study.
3) Arabic Honeypot Dataset: In addition to the Twitter
datasets described above we used the Arabic Honeypot dataset
provided by Morstatter et al. [17]. This data was collected
using a honeypot network. Morstatter et al. reported that the
dataset contains 6,285 accounts, and 725,179 Twitter posts
published by those accounts. Because this dataset only con-
tains the Twitter account ID and Twitter post ID, the Twitter
REST API service was used in order to obtain the missing
information about the accounts and posts. Not that only 5,270
Twitter accounts out of the 6,285 are still operational when
this study was conducted. Next, we filtered out 1,144 of the
5,270 accounts, because either the accounts were suspended,
the accounts had less than thirty posts for analysis, or the
privacy settings were changed to protected, preventing us from
collecting their private posts. Overall, we collected 652,128
posts from 4,126 accounts, among them 2,042 abusers and
2,084 legitimate accounts. A summary of all of the datasets
used in this study is presented in Table I.
B. Account Classification
We evaluate the account similarity functions presented in
Section III-B by applying a KNN classifier (with (1 ≤ k ≤ 5).
The size of the training set varied from 1 to 40% of the labeled
accounts in each dataset. Every evaluation round was executed
five times with different randomly selected training sets. The
performance indicators used are the Area under ROC curve
(AUC) and F1 measures.
Figure 4 presents the average performance of the similarity
functions for the Manually Labeled Accounts, Verified Abuser,
and Arabic Honeypot datasets. The x-axis corresponds to the
percent of labeled accounts used as a training set. The y-axis
corresponds to the AUC (left) and the F1 measure (right).
Fig. 4. Average AUC and F1 scores obtained with the three datasets
In all of the datasets, the bag-of-words was found to
be the superior similarity function according to both AUC
and F1 measures. It also has the lowest standard deviation
for both AUC and F1 ranging from 0.002 to 0.016 across
TABLE I
DATASETS SUMMARY
Domain CollectedAccounts
Collected
Posts
Labeling
Method Legitimate Accounts Abusers
Virtual TV 89,111 188,211 Manual labeling 316 289Buying crowdturfing services 1,068 1,006
Arabic Honeypot 4,126 652,128 honeypot 2,084 2,042
all datasets, and it outperforms both the simpler common-
posts similarity function and the more sophisticated topic-
distribution similarity function. It is interesting to note that
common-posts is the worst performing similarity function for
detecting the abusers that are employed with the crowdturfing
platforms. This observation strengths the idea that accounts
used for crowdturfing (some of which are human operated)
cannot be detected easily by publishing the same content.
However, these accounts are detected with a high degree of
accuracy by all of the other similarity functions, with the bag-
of-words reaching AUC, and F1 measures of 0.996 with about
800 accounts in the training set (40%). Profile properties (e.g.,
number of followers, account age) and behavioral properties
(e.g., number of hashtags) perform reasonably well, achieving
similar results in all datasets. The worse similarity function in
the Arabic Honeypot dataset was topic-repr. While surprised
by this result, we attribute to the poor performance of standard
LDA based topic detection algorithms on the Arabic language.
Surprisingly, high performance of the common-posts similarity
function suggests that the number of automated accounts is
relatively high in this dataset.
C. Topic Authenticity
We measured the topic authenticity for the virtual TV
dataset described in Section IV-A. The Arabic Honeypots
data set was not included in this analysis because (1) the
researchers lack knowledge of the Arabic language and could
not qualitatively validate the calculated topic authenticity, and
(2) LDA seemed to perform poorly on this dataset without
proper tuning. The number of topics in the collected Virtual
TV data was optimized empirically to produce 48 coherent
topics. Based on the Manually Labeled Accounts training set,
we computed an authenticity score for each unlabeled author
in the dataset. The bag-of-words similarity function was used
for this purpose, since it provided the best performance in
terms of the AUC and F1 measures.
In order to visually represent the authenticity of each topic
we used donut charts as depicted in Figure 5. For the sake of
brevity, we show the authenticity distribution of just six of the
forty-eight topics found in the Manually Labeled Accounts
dataset. In the middle of each donut chart we include the
word cloud representing the topic. Words are sized based on
their probability of being associated with the given topic. The
inner circle of the donut chart enclosing each word cloud
represents the account authenticity distribution as presented
in Equation 2. Similarly, the outer circle depicts the post level
authenticity distribution as presented in Equation 1.
It can seen that in some cases (e.g., topics 1,2, and 4)
the fraction of posts is disproportional to the fraction of
accounts having the same authenticity level. This means that
a few accounts (legitimate accounts in the case of topic 1
and abusers in the case of topic 4) took over the discussion
in these topics and may have had a strong influence on
the other accounts who wrote on this topic. Overall, it is
easy to distinguish between topics in which most of the
participating accounts are legitimate and topics overwhelmed
with abusers. For example, the online discussions about online
support platforms seem to be authentic. In contrast, topics
mentioning Amazon and bidding are highly promoted by OSM
abusers. Statistical analysis of the authenticity distributions
using ANOVA identified groups of online discussions that
contain commercial content (largely prone to abusers) and
groups of online discussions that raise little financial interest
(mostly authentic). These results show that the proposed
analytical pipeline for topic authenticity estimation makes
sense, confirming that the suggested approach to detect OSM
manipulation in politics and various other domains can be used
in future studies.
Fig. 5. Authenticity distribution in six topics from the Virtual TV dataset
V. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Collecting data from OSM has raised ethical concerns in
recent years [30], [31], [32], [33]. In order to minimize
the potential risks that may arise from such activities, this
study follows recommendations presented by [34] and [35],
which deal with ethical challenges regarding OSM and Internet
communities.
In this study VICO Research & Consulting GmbH provided
publicly available posts from Twitter. To obtain missing infor-
mation about accounts and their posts, we used the Twitter
REST API which only provides public information. This
means that we do not collect the information of accounts that
do not agree to share their information publicly.
The Arabic Honeypot dataset made available to the research
community lacks the identifiable properties of accounts; in
addition, in the published dataset we replaced all tweets that
appear less than 20 times on Twitter with words randomly
selected from the topic’s word distribution.
The research protocol was approved by the Ben-Gurion
University of the Negev Human Research Ethics Committee.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this study, we demonstrated topic authenticity on three
Twitter datasets. Based on the results we can draw the follow-
ing conclusions: First, the similarity function that provided the
best performance was the bag-of-words, which obtained the
highest average AUC and F1 and the lowest standard deviation
for each of the datasets. These results demonstrate that the
bag-of-words is the optimal similarity function for measuring
the accounts’ authenticity among the five similarity functions
we measured.
Second, with regard to the AUC and F1 performance
measures, in the Verified Abuser dataset we obtained to almost
the maximal result, as opposed to the two other datasets
which obtained AUC and F1 measures of approximately 0.8.
We believe that the high performance of the Verified Abuser
dataset was due to the composition of accounts provided
by crowdturfing sites which were actually simple bots. The
characteristics of simple bots are likely easier to identify than
the more sophisticated abusers found in other datasets used in
our evaluation.
Third, by using our proposed method we succeeded at
differentiating between topics that are prone to OSM ma-
nipulation and topics that attract authentic public interest.
Moreover, due to the fact that our proposed method includes
a manual labeling process that contains clustering analysis,
even with a small number of labeled abusers we can detect
manipulated topics.
In the future, we plan to evaluate the presented approach
on additional datasets spanning multiple social networks, and
compare the topic authenticity across multiple domains, such
as politics, sports, etc. In addition, we think that it will be
interesting to understand whether the abusers follow the same
pattern in other domains. Moreover, we aim to incorporate the
capability of detecting camouflaged abusers into our approach.
We also would like to measure the use of the bag-of-words for
clustering analysis in order to improve the clusters provided .
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